In recent decades, the responsibility for the financing of compulsory education in rural China has rested with townships and villages which, with limited tax authority and uneven revenue capacity, increasingly relied on a plethora of arbitrarily imposed fees 
Introduction
The provision of nine-year compulsory education in China since 1985 has been very decentralized, with major responsibility for its financing resting with lower levels of government such as townships and villages in rural areas, or cities and districts in urban areas. Since the 1990s, some local governments, with limited tax authority and uneven revenue capacity, have increasingly relied on extra-budgetary revenues collected from a plethora of arbitrarily imposed fees. The result was an untransparent and widely dispersed school finance system, in which poor and rural areas faced the dilemma of underfunded education and excessive local taxation burdens. These challenges were manifestations of China's imbalanced intergovernmental fiscal arrangements, which combined a highly centralized revenue system with very decentralized fiscal responsibilities for public service delivery, in particular after 1994's tax-assignment reform (Lin et al. 2007 ).
Since 2000, the central government in China has initiated a series of rural taxation reforms to address the issue of widespread rural discontent over excessive fiscal burden (Lin et al. 2007 ). In the first stage, "Tax-For-Fee," all rural fees (including those for compulsory education) were removed and replaced with an agriculture tax and related surcharges. Early evidence suggests that farmers' burdens may have been dramatically reduced as a result of Tax-For-Fee. However, there are concerns about how the reform has affected the adequacy and equity of China's rural education finance (Kennedy 2007) .The second stage of rural taxation reforms was launched in 2004, with the goal of phasing out the agricultural tax entirely within three years (Li 2008) . The central government has accordingly made several adjustments to the provision of rural education finance. But the full impact of this recent reform on China's compulsory education remains unclear. How did the rural taxation reforms change the previous finance system for compulsory education in rural China? What has been their impact on the adequacy and equality of funding for compulsory education in rural areas? What kind of problems still exists in the current compulsory education finance system for rural China? Using a provincial-level dataset from 1998 to 2006, this article aims to answer these questions in the context of intergovernmental fiscal relations. This paper is organized into six sections. Following this section is a description of China's education finance system reforms since the 1980s. The third section traces changes of China's rural education finance policies resulting from recent tax reforms.
Section four summarizes previous studies on the adequacy and equality of China's compulsory education. Section five discusses data and research questions, and presents empirical results. The final section concludes and addresses theoretical and policy implications.
China's Compulsory Education System Since 1985
In 1985, China established a system of nine-year compulsory basic education, which included primary and lower-secondary education (Tsang 1996 (Tsang , 2000 . Launched correspondingly was an education finance reform, which had two defining characteristics: decentralization of the administrative structure, and diversification in the mobilization of educational resources. First, the decentralization of education administration was based on the principle of "local responsibility and administration by levels," that is, different levels of compulsory education were administered and financed by different levels of local government. 1 In rural areas, townships and village governments were responsible for the provision and financing of lower-secondary and primary education, respectively. In urban areas, cities and urban districts were responsible for the provision and financing of lower-secondary and primary education, respectively (Tsang 2002 ).
Second, financial resources for basic education came from both budgetary funds and extra-budgetary funds. The budgetary funds included two sources: allocations of local governments' own-source revenue, and categorical grants from central and provincial governments, which constituted only a minor source of funding for education (Tsang 1996) . The extra-budgetary funds included funding from local surcharges/levies 2 and social contributions, such as individual or organizational donations (Tsang 1996) .
After the 1985 education finance reform, extra-budgetary funds generated at the local level constituted an increasing share of total resources to China's compulsory education, and thus local governments (at and below the county level) became the primary financing source for budgetary expenditures on compulsory education (Tsang 1996; Tsang 2001) .
1 Fiscal and administrative responsibilities in China are organized in a five-level hierarchy: (1) the central government, (2) provincial-level governments, (3) prefecture-level governments, (4) county-level governments, including counties (in rural areas) and county-level cities (in urban areas), and (5) townshiplevel governments, including towns (in rural areas) and districts (in urban areas). For a description of China's governmental structure, please see http://www.economicexpert.com/a/Political:divisions:of:China.htm (retrieved 03/30/2009). 2 In rural areas, educational levies were imposed on agricultural taxes paid by rural households, and revenue from these levies was used for education in the same locality. As additional payments based on existing taxes, education levies were not regarded as "official" taxes. Therefore, levies were flexible; they did not need a lengthy process for approval and adoption, and were not regulated by law (Tsang 1996) .
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The 1985 reform was successful in mobilizing additional resources for compulsory education. However, research shows that the level of government investment in education was still inadequate compared to other developing countries (Tsang 2000) . In addition, the over-decentralization of financing compulsory education put a great financial strain on local governments, especially in rural townships and villages. With limited investment from higher levels of the government and uneven levels of economic development and fiscal capacity in different places, compulsory education encountered significant financial difficulties in many poor areas, and there were substantial and widening education fiscal disparities across locations. These deficiencies persisted and even intensified through the 1990s (Tsang 2000) .
Changes of Rural Education Finance Due to Recent Tax Reforms
Since the establishment of the compulsory education system in 1985, China has had two major rounds of general tax reforms: the 1994 tax-assignment reform and the rural taxation reforms since 2000.
The 1994 Tax-Assignment Reform
The 1994 tax-assignment reform established a new taxation system with dedicated central, local, and shared taxes, and created a new structure of tax administration (Wang 1997) . As a rearrangement of intergovernmental fiscal relations between the central and provincial levels, the reform led to a higher concentration of fiscal capacity at the central level while keeping many fiscal responsibilities such as education or public health with lower level governments (Lin et al. 2007 ). "turning a blind eye to illicit fee collections" (Lin et al. 2007) . Over time, these informal levies were abused in some rural areas and led to excessive tax burden for farmers, triggering rural taxation reforms in recent years.
Rural Taxation Reforms Since 2000
Before 2000, China's rural tax revenue came from four major sources. The first was the formal agriculture taxes levied at the national or provincial level. The second source was an implicit tax known in China as "price scissors," through which the central government extracted a profit from farmers by mandatory procurement of grains at below-market prices and then selling them to urban residents at higher prices. The third source was several standard surcharges ("santi wutong") collected by rural governmental units (Lin et al. 2007) . 3 As the fourth source, townships and villages also collected additional discretionary revenues. One early approach of such collection was to add a margin for household grain procurement on top of the central government's quota. This approach, however, ceased to work when the central government's "price scissors"
diminished as a result of market liberation of China's agriculture sector in the late 1980s.
In response, in the 1990s many rural areas (especially those in agriculture-based regions) experienced a surge of diverse, illegal local fees that were imposed on farmers, without explicit government regulations or legislation. 4 These fees were not formally budgeted, and constituted a significant share of farmers' excessive tax burden, leading to widespread rural discontent. To address this issue, since 2000 the central government has installed a series of "Tax-For-Fee" rural taxation reforms, removing all fees and replacing them with agriculture taxes and related surcharges (Lu et al. 2004) . To compensate for the loss of revenue, the reform raised the agricultural tax to 7% on average, 5 and allowed a surcharge to agricultural taxes (nongyeshui fujia) equivalent to the maximum of 20% of the tax payment imposed on farmers (Yep 2004 ).
The Tax-For-Fee reform helped to lower farmers' burden and reduce rural tension in China (Yep 2004 ), but it has been controversial because of its undue effects on the7 fiscal capacity of local governments to provide public services such as compulsory education (Wong and Bird 2005) . The reform abolished extra-budgetary fundraising for education but did not specify a certain percentage of the agricultural tax (or surcharge) for compulsory education. Thus, the inadequacy in funding for compulsory education has become a more significant problem (Kennedy 2007) . 6 The provincial governments increased their investment in education for townships and villages, but the transfer payments from above did not fully compensate for the loss of funding for village and township governments (Yep 2004) . 
Critical Issues: Adequacy and Equity of China's Compulsory Education
To evaluate a system of education finance, there are three commonly used criteria: adequacy, equity, and efficiency (Levin 1995) . Adequacy refers to the mobilization of sufficient resources to support a desired level of education services.
Equity relates to fairness in resource mobilization and allocation. Efficiency in education resource allocation refers to maximizing the performance of education with given resources (Tsang 2001) . In this article, we focus on adequacy and equity of China's compulsory education in rural areas, in particular, how they have been affected by the recent rural taxation reforms. 
Adequacy of China's Compulsory Education
Adequacy of education finance may be measured in many different ways. At the national level, two traditionally used measures have been: (1) the share of education investment on total Gross Domestic Product or Gross National Product (education-GDP/GNP share), with 8% normally considered as adequate, and (2) the share of public education expenditures in total governmental budget (education-budget share), with 20%
as a common benchmark (Carnoy 1995) . The two measures, however, have been criticized as only accounting for the input side of education finance. Since the 1970s, the World Bank has adopted a new measurement system that emphasizes education outcomes, tracking the enrollment in primary or secondary schools for certain age groups, the rate of adult illiteracy, and whether there is equal education opportunity for females (Carnoy 1995) . Some of these measures have been used to evaluate the adequacy of China's compulsory education. For example, Li (2008) found that the average education-GNP-share rose to 2.6% in the late 1990s from 2.2% before 1978, and the average education-budget-share rose to 12.9% from 6.5% during the same period. These findings indicate the success of 1985 reforms in mobilizing additional resources. However, the education-GNP/GDP-share and education-budget-share were still much lower than international benchmarks.
Another way to measure adequacy of education finance is to analyze per-pupil education funding, the composition of resources, and how they are utilized. Tsang (2005) found that, in 1999, for China as a whole, per-pupil total (recurrent and capital) spending was 701 RMB (about $85) at the primary level, 93.9% of which was recurrent expenditures (mostly personnel cost). 9 At the lower-secondary level, per-pupil total spending was 1,165 RMB (about $140), 92.0% of which was recurrent spending.
Commonly seen in developing countries, this high percentage of personnel cost in lowerlevels of schooling indicates that schools have limited capacity to provide resources beyond a minimal level of basic operation (Tsang 2005 
Equity of China's Compulsory Education
The problem of unevenly financed compulsory education in China has attracted a lot of studies since the 1990s. Studies consistently find substantial disparities in per-pupil spending across areas and regions in primary and secondary education, and they also suggest a widening gap in per-pupil spending over time, particularly at the primary level.
Some of these studies used province as a unit of analysis (Tsang 1994 , Jiang and Zhang 1999 , Du and Wang 2000 , Li 2008 ). According to Tsang (1994) , in 1989, the topspending province spent as much as 5.2 times that of the bottom-spending province, in terms of per-pupil total school spending in primary education; the corresponding ratio 9 Recurrent spending was allocated between personnel and non-personnel subcategories. Nationwide, personnel spending constituted about three quarters of the recurrent spending at the primary level and about two-thirds at the lower-secondary level (Tsang 2005) . 10 Among recurrent expenditures, the non-personnel portion is broken down into several sub-categories.
For both schooling levels, the largest spending item was minor repair and renovation; administrative spending was in second place. Teaching related items (instructional spending plus spending on equipment) combined for slightly more than one-quarter of non-personnel spending (Tsang 2005) . 11 In 1999, at the primary level nationwide, 37.2% of the total expenditure relied on extra-budgetary funds; at the lower-secondary level, the percentage was 42.4% (Tsang 2005) .
was 4.5 in secondary (both lower-and upper-) education. In 1997, these ratios rose to 9.2 in primary education and 7.1 in lower-secondary education; in 2000, they became 10.6 in primary education and 6.6 in lower-secondary education (Tsang 2001) . Jiang and Zhang (1999) grouped the thirty provinces into three "Education Regions" according to the Ministry of Education's categorization of educational progress and capacity, 12 and found that the ratio of total school spending among the three regions grew from 2.8:1.5:1.0 in 1988 to 3.0:2.0:1.0 in 1992.
Other studies of education finance disparities focused on the county level. Based on county-level data in 1997 and 1999, Tsang (2005) found that the spending gap was particularly substantial between urban and rural areas, and between coastal and other regions, while the gap between minority and non-minority areas was relatively modest. showed that intra-provincial inequality is more pronounced than the inter-provincial, albeit the relative shares of the two inequalities vary in different studies. Most studies agreed that the intra-provincial variation accounted for around 70% of the entire regional disparities (Wang 2001; Pan 2000; Tsang 2005 ); some even found within-province inequality could account for more than 90% of total inequality, despite the fact that provincial governments are officially required to provide a balanced compulsory education among counties within a province.
Substantial and even widening gaps in China's education finance are also reflections of growing disparities in economic development and in the distribution of income across regions and areas in the country (Wang and Hu 1999) . Many scholars found local wealth (GNP, GDP, or personal income) to be a significant predictor of the inequalities of compulsory education, indicating that China's compulsory education was not wealth-neutral (Tsang 1994; Pan 2000; Wang 2002; Ding 2003) . In particular, regions with higher per capita output tended to spend more from both budgetary and extra-budgetary sources, and the difference on the extra-budgetary side was especially significant (Tsang 1994) . Over time, education in turn becomes a significant determinant of income and the distribution of income (Chen 2003) , forming a self-reinforcing vicious cycle of disparities. This is why most scholars who touched on this issue called for intergovernmental transfer for compulsory education to address the urgent issue.
Data, Research Questions and Empirical Results
We compiled provincial-level data about education finance and education development during 1998-2006. 13 The education finance data include variables of education revenue sources and expenditure types for primary and lower-secondary schools in both urban and rural areas. In order to control for differences in the cost of public services delivery across provinces and over time, we adjust the financial data during 1998-2006 with the spatial price deflators provided by Brandt and Holz (2006 (Lerman and Yitzhaki 1985) to analyze how different expenditure categories contribute to the overall dispersion of per-pupil total education spending.
Adequacy of China's Compulsory Education after Rural Taxation Reforms
In 2006 . 17 The education-budget share has fluctuated modestly around 13-15%, still below the common international benchmark of 20%.
Even though the total education expenditures in China have been inadequate at both primary and lower-secondary schools, some outcome measures show that China has made progress in its provision of compulsory education. For example, the percentage of school teachers with at least twelve or fourteen years of education in primary or lowersecondary schools has increased from 62.8% and 27.1%, respectively, in 1986 (Li, 2008) to over 95% in 2005. and even decreased for lower-secondary schools. This illustrates that insufficient capital spending remained a serious challenge for schools in rural areas.
In Table 1 we can also compare budgetary spending and personnel spending. 1998-2006. 19 Though the amount of total surcharges began to decline after 2000, it actually started to rise again after 2003 due to the rapid increase in the amount of urban surcharges. This echoes some survey findings by Lin et al. (2007) . inequality between urban and rural schools, we find that in urban schools the inequality has increased slightly over the period of 1998-2006, possibly due to widening economic and income disparities. In rural areas, the inequality remained at almost the same level after financial responsibilities were centralized from townships or villages to counties, which may have led to more equitable budgetary-recurrent appropriations. In addition, Table 3 shows that the level of inequality in total surcharges has increased drastically since 2000. Since the implementation of rural taxation reforms, the Gini coefficients for total surcharges in rural areas have become much higher than in urban areas. This indicates that the reforms may have created some differential impact on the usage of urban and rural surcharges across provinces and between urban and rural areas.
Equity of China's Compulsory Education after Rural Taxation Reforms
Examining the composition of revenue sources for total surcharges, we find that change in the level of inequality mainly came from the rapid increase in "urban surcharges," which were available for both urban and some rural schools, although the reforms effectively curtailed rural surcharges and the inequality thereof.
On the expenditure side, Table 4 presents the Gini coefficients of per-pupil recurrent expenditures, personnel expenditures, and capital expenditures. Overall, the levels of inequality for capital expenditures were around 0.6 and 0.7, much higher than that for recurrent expenditures (mostly personnel spending), which are around 0.2 to 0.3. Finally, following the Lerman and Yitzhaki (1985) approach, we decompose the contribution of various categories of spending to the dispersion of per-pupil total spending for compulsory education. The analyses show that, for both school levels in almost all of the years, personnel spending (mostly teacher salary guaranteed by government budgetary appropriations) has the highest significant marginal effect in absolute value on the inequality of per-pupil total spending in comparison to nonpersonnel and capital spending, because personnel spending accounts for a very high proportion of the total spending. In addition, inequality of personnel spending for rural schools appeared to be somewhat different prior to and after the rural taxation reforms.
The marginal effect of personnel spending on total spending inequality turned negative after the implementation of the Tax-for-Fee reform in 2000. This suggests that, although the personnel spending by itself remained unevenly distributed, it has helped to bring down the level of overall inequality in per-pupil total spending for compulsory education across provinces in recent years.
Conclusion and Discussions
In summary, the rural taxation reforms implemented since 2000 have made some progress in restructuring the financing mechanism for China's compulsory education.
The adequacy of China's compulsory education in rural areas has improved to some 20 extent after the implementation of these reforms. The increase of governmental funding led to more sufficient recurrent spending, especially personnel spending; however, insufficient capital spending remained a serious challenge for schools, especially those in rural areas. The increase in intergovernmental transfers and budgetary spending also contributed to reducing the overall inequality in total expenditures for compulsory education, but the reforms did not show any significant impact in closing the gap in the level of educational spending between rural and urban areas, or alleviating the inequality in educational revenue and spending across provinces or between rural and urban areas over the period of 1998-2006. Obviously, further reforms are needed to improve the financing system of China's compulsory education.
The issues surrounding compulsory education are actually manifestations of China's imbalanced intergovernmental fiscal arrangements in the country's economic and administrative transition. To better understand the origins of these issues or to suggest policy options for addressing them, it is helpful to discuss them from the perspectives of fiscal decentralization and intergovernmental fiscal relations.
Over the last several decades, fiscal decentralization has been a widely discussed topic for emerging and transition economies, with the premise that there can be gains of efficiency, effectiveness, and accountability by moving government closer to the people (Musgrave 1983) . Related experiments, however, have brought mixed and complicated results (for instance, Davoodi and Zou 1998) . Experiences show many counter arguments that favor fiscal centralization, such as control at the central government level, the direction of investment on social overhead, and equalization of basic public service delivery (Bahl 1999) . Scholars come to the understanding that the design of intergovernmental fiscal relations, whether decentralization or centralization, is a dynamic process that should be studied in the comprehensive context including types and features of services, political structure, and administrative capacity at all levels of governments (see the twelve "implementation rules for fiscal decentralization" in Bahl 1999). The case of rural taxation reforms and China's compulsory education finance provide a great example to study such a dynamic process.
What has caused the excessive burden of fees and charges for farmers in China?
The fundamental reason is China's imbalanced intergovernmental fiscal arrangements, which combine very decentralized fiscal responsibilities with a highly centralized revenue system, especially after the 1994 tax-assignment reform (Lin et al. 2007 ). With limited tax capacity to fulfill public service mandates (such as compulsory education), local governments, especially those in rural areas, had to rely on extra-budgetary sources through all kinds of fees and charges. These informal taxation sources easily got out of control due to local decision makers' "rent-seeking" behavior, because (1) fees and charges were less transparent than formal taxes, (2) rural governments were not held accountable to local farmers, and (3) there were insufficient mechanisms for monitoring and controlling from higher level of governments due to information asymmetry. Recent rural taxation reforms have prohibited local governments in rural areas from eliciting illegal fees and charges. However, unless the issue of imbalanced intergovernmental fiscal arrangements is solved-either through centralizing some service responsibilities, enhancing local taxing power, or providing additional intergovernmental transfersinformal revenue sources are sure to regain their importance. They even may turn excessive over time, as suggested by the "Huang Zhongxi's Law," based on many similar stories from Chinese history (Qin 2003) .
Similar examples are abundant in the U.S. For example, after the passage of Proposition 13 in California, the newly-imposed tight tax and expenditure limits required large reductions in property taxes and effectively prevented local governments from replacing those property tax revenues in the future. Because local governments could not increase school spending to desired levels, many of them have turned to increased fees, parent contributions or fundraising by school associations, and other ways to generate extra revenue (Fisher 2007) .
Why has compulsory education in China been persistently underfunded? On one hand, the level of education investment continued to be low in China even compared with other developing countries, and the situation remained unchanged after additional intergovernmental transfers were provided as components of the rural taxation reforms in recent years. In fact, investigations have found that intergovernmental transfers tended to be directed to purposes other than education unless the funding was earmarked and closely monitored (Li 2008) . Other than economic reasons, the unchanging situation is, in part, due to the fact that responsibility for the provision of compulsory education rests with the lowest levels of government. According to Bahl (1999) , higher-level governments should play a role in services with substantial externalities, such as education, because local governments such as townships or villages will not have incentives for providing a sufficient level of such services.
Another reason for underfunding lies in the accountability mechanism and the appraisal system. Local government officials in China are held accountable by higher-level governments, with their performance typically measured by short-term indicators of economic development, such as major infrastructure projects, urban expansion and beautification, and the growth of GDP. Thus they have the tendency to place a low priority on compulsory education that has effects mostly in the long run (Li 2008) . On the other hand, China's compulsory education is very unevenly provided. The education inequality is, in part, a manifestation of economic and fiscal disparities across different regions and between urban and rural areas (Wang and Hu 1999) , but it is also caused by the over-decentralization of education administration. Since the 1970s, most states in the U.S. have attempted to equalize educational opportunity across districts, resulting in increased state financial commitments and corresponding decreases in local financial responsibility. In consequence, the state share of school finance has surpassed the local share in most years since then (Fisher 2007 ). China's 2001 education reform to move the responsibility of compulsory education from the township and village levels to the county level is heading towards the right direction, but the county-level of government is still very low for shouldering the major responsibilities of compulsory education, unless substantial intergovernmental transfers for education can be provided by higher levels of government.
What future directions should China take for the provision of compulsory education? As has been shown in this study, the investigation of China's education reform cannot be separated from China's rapid transition of general fiscal and administrative reforms. Issues of insufficient and uneven funding in compulsory education can only be solved by reforming intergovernmental fiscal relations to better match fiscal responsibilities with revenue authorities, and through reforms of political and administrative systems to better align governmental accountability. Lin et al. (2007) suggest that local governments should be provided with more formal tax autonomy, such as enacting local property taxes, and should encourage more meaningful participation by expanding local democracy in the long run. In addition, we argue that the central or provincial governments should place a higher priority on the financing and administration of compulsory education to secure a sufficient and equitable delivery of public services.
Overall, this analysis of rural taxation reforms in the Chinese context suggests that a reform with the good intention of reducing local tax burdens by restricting local governmental revenue choices may have undue effects on the provision of an essential public service. Solving these issues requires corresponding reforms in intergovernmental fiscal relations to rebalance fiscal responsibilities and revenue authorities, and to maintain proper accountability for local officials. The pursuit of an equalized and adequate education finance system and the balance between more state involvement and control with local autonomy have also been a central issue of debate in the U.S. While it has been popular to push for more centralized funding for creating greater equity, policymakers in the U.S. may learn from this Chinese experience when they reform their school finance systems, thereby avoiding similar unintended consequences. 
